

STRATEGIC CHANGE

Strategic Study Report on the Redevelopment of Swiss Security Policy

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I. Situation

In the summer of 1996 the Swiss federal council appointed a **study commission for strategic questions under the chairmanship of former federal councillor Eduard Brunner (the so-called Brunner Commission)** to look into the development of the situation in respect of Swiss security policy over the coming 20 to 25 years, without going into any details concerning the reorganisation of the Swiss armed forces and civil defence organisation. 'The task of the commission is to develop the political guidelines. The operational translation of the ideas into a military assignment and military structures will then be the task of the Swiss defence ministry.'

The commission presented its final report under the title 'Report of the Study Commission for Strategic Questions' on 26 February 1998.

I reject the final report of the Brunner commission: **If the proposals of the Brunner report were to be implemented in practice, we would not get a better security policy. On the contrary: the ability to defend our liberty, independence and security would be decisively weakened.** The report is neither useful nor suitable for a future strategy in this context.

II. Review

One thing is indisputable: security policy must continuously adapt to new requirements, i.e. it must first and foremost be geared to meet **changing potential threats**. In this light, the current efforts aimed at developing suitable reforms for the army must be welcomed. However, a prerequisite for appropriate reforms is the ability to analyse and determine the **future situation** in an unbiased manner. Unfortunately, the Brunner report fails to provide a suitable basis upon which answers to the question as to what kind of security policy Switzerland will be needing in the years to come can be developed. The main points of my criticism are as follows:

1. Instead of analysing and assessing possible developments over the coming years **the report bases on the current situation and simply projects it across the board into the future**. The report neither acknowledges nor takes into account the latest writings in this field. As a consequence, **the report preaches yesterday's progress**. It overlooks the fact that the major strategic changes of 1989/90 did not produce the expected 'fresh start', but merely an interlude of a few years with a lot of idealism, peace hopes, proliferating international institutions and a deluge of conferences, charters and collective diplomacy. The grand promises and great expectations have turned out to be hollow. Regrettably, the report remains stranded in the state of euphoria experienced about 10 years ago. **This paper will therefore attempt to redress the balance, by outlining the developments that have been experienced since then.**

2. The Brunner report overlooks the fact that the world is quite clearly **moving back to practices that were assumed to have been overcome: gunboat diplomacy, power struggles, military alliances, military interventions**. The people are the same, the rhetoric is unchanged, but reality paints a different picture. The Brunner commission did not want to know anything whatsoever about these things, which is why they remained unaccounted for in the report.

3. Because the commission's report remained anchored to the out-of-date way of thinking of the early nineties, it is characterised by **international activism, idealism, moralising, by patchwork, meddling in outside affairs, obedience in advance towards major and medium-sized powers, and by an urge to join international alliances**. For our country, this does not mean enhanced security. On the contrary, it represents **a major threat to our freedom, independence and direct democracy**.

4. In many cases it seems that the **dreadful face of war is being ignored**, and that war is hence being dealt with in an irresponsible way.

5. **The report disassociates itself from the principle of permanent neutrality**, which is an important maxim of Switzerland's security policy. This rejection is not explained. Perhaps the authors believe in a future without any potential for aggression from outside. What they do not take into account is the fact that **we could thus easily become embroiled in international conflicts**, which would create major security risks for our small country. Conversely, however, **the new advantages offered by adherence to the principles of armed neutrality within a future pattern of forces are neither identified nor examined**.

6. Instead of looking ahead and showing the way for the security of Switzerland in the future, the **outdated notion** (which has been rejected by the Swiss voters) **of armed Swiss troops in action beyond the Swiss borders is once again put forward**. This call for an armed 'Swiss solidarity corps' – which could only be realised following amendment of the constitution and the relevant laws, and which is an even more questionable step than the 'blue berets' previously rejected by the Swiss people – must be **decisively rejected for neutrality and security reasons**.

7. **The Brunner report is being misused to achieve political goals that have nothing to do with the security of Switzerland**. In particular, we are being urged to join the EU, to become a member of 'Partnership for Peace', to enter into co-operation with NATO, to provide an armed Swiss peacekeeping unit for service abroad – a demand that is being marketed on the back of the flimsy pretext 'security policy'. The motive, however, is clear: after attempting (in vain) to 'sell' these things to the Swiss people as economic and general political necessities, the proponents are now trying to do the same thing using 'national security' arguments.

8. The Brunner report with its principal demands wants to achieve (or is willing to accept) the following developments:

- Step-by-step incorporation into UN, EU, WEU and NATO
- Progressive erosion of 'armed neutrality' without voters' approval and total abolition thereof over the longer term
- Surrender of independence
- Reemergence of the old 'blue beret' ideology for deployment of armed Swiss troops outside of Switzerland

III. Summarised conclusions for the Swiss security policy

1. Even if history does not repeat itself: already 100 years ago, the world was on the threshold of peace and prosperity, driven by new technologies and cross-border trade, supervised by a benevolent major power. **And the world nevertheless experienced the bloodiest century of its history.**

2. The euphoria that swept the world after 1989 envisaged 'eternal' peace and enduring respect of human rights in *one* world; people felt that these things could be achieved with a bit of 'peacemaking'. But this gospel at least has been crushed by reality: **security and power are inseparably linked, today and in the future.** The national state has proven to be a hardy entity – in Europe, too. Efforts to shift the **monopoly on the use of force** to international organisations such as UNO, OSCE were not and will not be successful. These facts may be regrettable, but to contest them would mean to refuse to accept realities.

3. The **causes of tomorrow's conflicts** will be rooted in **national interests, national expansion, in power, money, business, terrorism, oil, water, history, in religious and political ideologies, in politicians' quests for power and peoples' passions.** Switzerland in a globalised world must make sure that it is not at the mercy of others.

4. In the future, Switzerland will have to cope with **aggression other than that originated by modern, well-equipped armies** adhering to international law (asymmetrical war). Switzerland must find a defence against **foreign civil wars** that are carried into our country, with problems that are made worse by the ensuing migratory developments. Switzerland must be aware of the dangers arising if the **state monopoly on the use of force should break down. Today's Switzerland is poorly prepared to meet these dangers.**

5. **The following main types of future threats** caused by the use of violence and for which Switzerland is relatively ill-prepared can be listed at this point in time:

- The danger of foreign **civil wars** being carried into our country
- **International organised crime**
- The latest technological-electronic warfare (**information war**)
- **Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons** (weapons of mass destruction) which are now no longer weapons exclusively of the major powers.

The Swiss army and civil defence organisation must be prepared to meet these new dangers. Conversion is required, not reduction.

6. What does this mean for the army? The army needs an innovation boost.

To be able to wage a defensive information war with the capability to hit back, Switzerland needs a small and professional army that can be reinforced by calling up militia specialists. State-of-the-art equipment is required. Close collaboration with business and universities must be maintained to keep up with fast-moving developments in this field.

For the many 'primitive' forms of aggression – fighting on the ground – the future will require an appropriately trained, large body of troops equipped with modern – also non-lethal – weapons, troops that are skilled at fighting in towns and cities, i.e. territorial infantry in a new guise, a militia that is only called up when needed, with a backbone of professionals who guarantee top-quality training of the troops. The size of this army must ensure that if clashes between hostile ethnic groups should break out simultaneously in numerous towns and cities, the hostilities can be brought under control, and that the border can be guarded against penetration by reinforcements. This is a task that can only be performed by the militia: in a real crisis, a large number of troops will be required, i.e. a lot of soldiers of which some will know their way about the towns and cities. In peacetime, of course, no militia troops will be needed; they will only be called up in an emergency.

7. What does this mean for the civil defence organisation?

Civil defence and army must be prepared for new assignments: to help protect the people if weapons of mass destruction are used in our country, or to help deal with the effects of major disasters such as encountered after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. The civil defence organisation is equipped for many tasks, but it must be re-oriented to meet the new dangers. Training and equipment are still too extensively geared to traditional World War 2-type scenarios. The same applies to the civil defence as to the army: conversion, not reduction must be the motto.

8. Strict adherence to armed neutrality must be ensured. In view of the threats of the future, neutrality is of fresh and special significance. Neutrality must be seen as the diplomatic means of protecting small nations from the influence and pressures exerted by foreign powers. Neutrality boosts security and at the same time provides the credibility required to gain access to the people who need help in war and disaster zones.

9. Switzerland as a small nation must pursue a resourceful and independent security policy in times of future conflicts – also in the era of US predominance (pax americana) – with the aim of keeping a suitable distance to such events. In particular, Switzerland must show reticence in all matters that could cause it to participate in someone else's wars.

10. **America is indisputably the senior NATO partner.** And even though the purpose of the 'new' NATO has yet to be defined, the general mission is no longer the **joint defence of Europe, but the 'safeguarding of common interests' under US leadership.** Switzerland as a small nation cannot be interested in becoming an appendage of the 'peace power' NATO which will in future be tasked with intervention, from the Caucasus to Africa, from Korea to the South China Sea. NATO membership for Switzerland must be rejected, even if such membership is brought about in a roundabout way.

11. The **'NATO Partnership for Peace' (PfP)** is clearly directed at **rendering the non-NATO members controllable and willing to be controlled.** Any country not wishing to join NATO should not be there. **Any linkage – by way of direct membership or through increased commitment to PfP – would have a negative impact on the freedom of action in a time of uncertain future developments.** This would be irresponsible and must be rejected.

12. **There is no joint foreign and security policy within the EU,** and it will be a long time before a joint policy is developed. On a defence policy level, Europe remains a protectorate: dependent on US protection and US interests. **The notion that in the Europe of today an armed and neutral Switzerland could find a safe haven and protection against dangers** it cannot combat at root level and is hard pressed to defend itself against **is an illusion.**

13. **Delusions of security are generated by an exaggerated opinion of one's capabilities, by not being aware of the dangers, and by a lack of experience.** The Swiss security policy is currently in danger of walking into this trap. **The dangers of the future as well as the dangers of war and the hazardous nature of new power constellations are being underestimated.** The vision of a Swiss soldier marching off to a foreign civil war with a sidearm for his personal protection is a romantic caricature and an expression of crass ignorance of the realities. 'Yellow berets', 'solidarity soldiers' and similar inventions are mistaken responses to current security problems.

14. **Humanitarian interventions** – i.e. armed deployment with humanitarian goals – cannot be successful. Any participation in foreign conflicts is always **either an intervention** (whereby the participants will not be able to remain sitting on the fence) or a **non-partisan humanitarian activity.** A clean separation of politics and humanitarian aid is required, feasible and successful. **For Switzerland, this means a focus on the ICRC and on an unarmed relief or disaster corps.** Handled in the right way, both options offer special opportunities for neutral Switzerland. **Armed solidarity soldiers must be rejected.**

15. To want to join the Schengen treaty at this point in time, and hence to have to open up the Swiss frontiers, would be adventurous to say the least. **The Swiss borders must be guarded more – and not less – effectively against criminals from the outside.**

16. **Armed troops abroad** – i.e. solidarity troops or whatever they may be called – **must be rejected**. The army must focus on its core tasks. Military tourism must be stopped.

17. Switzerland has more to uphold than a peace defined as a state of non-war. It must uphold its freedom, independence and direct democracy. **The Swiss strategy is characterised by independence, openness to the world, the determination to stand up for our own interests, self-restriction in respect of Swiss presence on the international stage, courage and the willingness to take risks. The most important factors in this context are permanent neutrality as a foreign policy maxim, diplomacy, the army, the civil defence organisation and the national security organisation** as instruments to defend against aggression and to protect the inhabitants of our country.

18. **The motto of a new security policy must be as follows: ‘yes’ to change, ‘yes’ to a realistic defence against the dangers of our modern times, ‘yes’ to innovation and to the future.**

‘No’ to a naive security policy, no to a self-important and copycat foreign policy, ‘no’ to any desire to exert influence beyond one’s potential.

IV. The missed opportunity

'More ends than ever before'

The coming end of the second millennium is generating so much apprehension in so many people that they are seeing an **end** wherever they look: the end of the national state, of state sovereignty, of the war, of armed neutrality, of independence, of direct democracy, of autonomy, of national defence, of the military combat doctrines, of the traditional 'friend and foe' notions, of soldiers as fighting men, of the exclusive right of the state to exert force, of citizen soldiers in the militia, of the Western industrial society, of jobs, of the national economy, of the Asian economy, the end of the modern era. 'More ends than ever before'.¹ Politicians are ready with recipes for an imminent turnaround² and the one-time peace activists are re-heating not-so-fresh concept of eternal peace.³

Helpless activity

The dust raised by the collapse of the Soviet empire has settled. What has now come to light is a major disappointment in respect of the bold hopes of 1989/90. **War has returned, to Europe too.** Warships are sailing the seas, at action stations, people are killing each other with missiles and the most primitive weapons – machetes, for example. Well-meant help is of little use, military intervention cannot solve the political problems, elegantly worded charters and agreements are irrelevant, **the proliferating international band of functionaries and councillors meets and travels and travels and meets, but nobody is responsible for the ills.**

'...nothing new under the sun'

How many things are really new? The London 'Economist'⁴ took a closer look, and describes a summer morning in 1997:

'Crowds populate the streets of London to see a Royal procession. The Queen, in black, mourns a death that should not have been. In Russia the government is fighting for economic reforms. An inefficient, almost barbarian, economic system is the country's ball and chain. Canada and America are quarrelling over fishing rights and logging.' And in one of its articles the Economist warns of ambiguous facts and figures concerning Chinese trade in Hong Kong. Headlines of 1997? No – these are all stories from **1897!**⁵ We can dig deeper. **Today as 100 years ago there is only one superpower.** It used to be Britain, now it is the USA. For their contemporaries, both are seemingly unassailable, both have military bases throughout the world. As time passed, a rival began to challenge Britain: Germany. The Americans on their part are currently keeping a wary eye on China. **As in the past, peoples have to get used to redrawn national frontiers.** United Germany was but a few years old, new states came into being on the Balkan following the collapse of the Ottoman empire (Rumania, Bulgaria), just as occurred after the disintegration of the czarist-communist empire in Eastern Europe, in Central Asia and again on the Balkan. Our forefathers were no less amazed when technical inventions such as the automobile, radio, film and television appeared as we were when we first heard of things like mobile phones, the Internet or the Mars explorer vehicle. **The same economies headed the ranking lists then as now** (with one exception: Brazil has displaced Spain).

¹ This brief sentence was used already in 1991 by Robert Kurz at the beginning of his book 'Der Kollaps der Modernisierung. Vom Kasernensozialismus zur Krise der Weltökonomie', Frankfurt a. M., 1991.

² A new and original contribution to the millennium literature is provided by Barry Buzan & Gerald Segal: 'Anticipating the Future Twenty Millennia of Human Progress', London 1998. Reviewed by Alvin and Heidi Toffler in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1998, page 134 ff.

³ Ulrich Menzel: 'Globalisierung versus Fragmentierung', Frankfurt a. M., 1998, page 12: One World, peace union of the United Nations, final outlawing of war as an instrument of international politics and investment of the peace dividend thus obtained to finally bring about prosperity of the nations.

⁴ 'Economist' dated 20 December 1997, page 71 ff.

⁵ Queen Victoria celebrated her diamond jubilee and mourned the loss of her husband Prince Albert.

The end of the 19th century was similar to the end of our current century: falling transport costs and a steady flow of foreign investment boosted world trade, migratory surges caused population changes, the capital markets were well integrated. If there had been a Brunner commission then, its report would quite possibly have concluded as follows: 'Due to the fact that local or regional crises no longer serve as a pretext for direct confrontations between major powers, neither now nor in the foreseeable future, they cannot, no matter how serious they may be, escalate in scale to world war proportions.'

It is said that economic co-dependency, republican (democratic) constitutions and the potential horrors of war with the weapons on hand render war senseless and hence impossible. These arguments have been trotted out for the past 200 years, again and again, as arguments for enduring peace. **But only one thing is encountered more frequently than proclamations of the end of warfare: war itself.**⁶

I do not want to draw false conclusions: history does not repeat itself. However, this is a point to be learnt, to be used as a starting point for the development of new visions for the Swiss defence and security policy: one hundred years ago the world was already on the threshold to peace and prosperity, driven by new technologies, cross-border trade, and benevolently monitored by a freedom-loving major power. And then the world slipped into its bloodiest century ever. What we experience as change at breakneck pace is perhaps not as new as we think. 'Do not hope the enemy will not come. Be prepared!' This was written 2500 years ago, by Sun Dse,⁷ a Chinese philosopher whose writings are still studied all over the world.

Planning the future instead of describing the present

Being prepared for war must cover **possible future conflicts**. The next war is always different from the last war, different from the one that is being waged at the moment, and different from the war we can anticipate in advance. **Fanciful notions and a linear fixation on a single desired configuration**⁸ are as impermissible as the statement that 'we are in any case powerless in the face of the dangers that lurk in the future'.⁹ Fanciful notions and linear thinking on the one hand, and the surrender to an outlook characterised by a feeling of defencelessness on the other hand, are recurrent aspects of the Brunner report. What has to be done is to assess the options, examine possible scenarios (which start anew each and every day) and to provide instruments which can be adapted to the actual developments of history as they arise.

The Brunner report misses the opportunity to 'read' the future in a fashion that is as open and unbiased as the future actually is. It idealises the current developments to an inadmissible extent. It underestimates the changes that occurred in the middle of the nineties, shifts towards new forms of power struggles for hegemony and balance.¹⁰

Army reforms are uncontested – clear perspectives are needed

Firstly, like all the armies of Switzerland's neighbours, the army needs an innovation boost. *Secondly*, the existing army needs clear perspectives if it is not to be destroyed by the endless reform discussions.

⁶ Donald Kagan: 'On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace', New York, 1995.

⁷ aka Sun Zi or Sun Tse: 'The Art of War'. Various editions available.

⁸ The Brunner commission does not exclude the possibility of 'difficult phases' in the development of relations between our neighbours, but feels that it is 'more realistic to take into account the ongoing process which aims at producing an ever-closer integration of the peoples of Europe', and pins the fate of Switzerland wholly on this belief.

⁹ Defeatism has always been a widespread attitude, not only in Switzerland. The Brunner report is a contemporary example for the influence of this mental approach.

¹⁰ Klaus Hildebrand (ed.): 'Gleichgewicht und Hegemonie. Betrachtungen über ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatengeschichte', new edition Zurich 1997.

The Swiss militia army is the precise mirror image of society, perhaps more so than other armies. **Flights of fancy of officials who have little affinity with the people and with military matters, who have more contact with international organisations than with soldiers and citizens, shall not be supported; they must be assessed in the cold light of reality.**

Thirdly, the army needs the full attention and the undiluted clout of the ministry and military heads if the reform project 'Army '95' is to be completed. **If you launch new reforms before the current ones have been completed you risk failure on both counts.**

Against excessive idealism

Like other and more recent reports dealing with the same subject matter, the Brunner report is to a large extent permeated by the terminology and thought patterns of the excessive idealism encountered in the aftermath of any war: after 1918 (League of Nations), 1945 (UNO) and 1989/90 (the concept peace, human rights, *one world*, peacemaking). But the wind has already turned: one only has to open the windows and look outside. The new reality is rendered apparent by the tug-of-war conducted in the UN security council over Iraq, by the response of the European 'security organisation' to the crisis in Kosovo, by the struggle for oil fields and oil pipelines in the Caspian region, in Afghanistan, in Africa to the north and south of the Sahara, by the bank, currency and financial crises in Asia, by Israel's 'peace process', by the activities of the secret service of a 'friendly' state in Switzerland, by the boycott threats from America against Swiss banks and the counter-threats issued by Swiss members of parliament and newspapers, by the crises in the armed forces of our more or less distant neighbours. The newly emergent realism provides more convincing explanations of current events and possible developments than can be expected on the basis of idealism of the kind that is still cultivated in university and diplomatic circles.¹¹ Of course, one can view the changes with regret, one can seek ways to get around them, but one cannot ignore them. **Geopolitics is suddenly a most fashionable topic** – and the fact that it was long condemned by the social sciences is now seen as somewhat provincial¹² – **the interdependence of the terms 'security' and 'power' is a solid fact, no matter what anyone may say.**

The national state has proven its durability in Europe, too.¹³ **The attempt to shift the state monopoly on the use of force to international organisations such as UNO and OSCE were not and will not be successful.**¹⁴ **There is no joint foreign and security policy within the EU,**¹⁵ **and none will emerge over the coming decades. The new NATO has only its name and a few traditions in common with the NATO of the past.**

¹¹ Benjamin Frankel: 'Roots of Realism', London, 1996.

¹² Rückkehr der Geopolitik', an incomplete reference to a number of highbrow newspapers dealing with this topic, in 'Weltwoche' 5 March 1998.

Gabriel Wackermann: 'Géopolitique de l'espace mondial. Dynamique et enjeux', Paris 1997.

Re the conflict concerning geopolitics as a pseudo-science and the German Nazi entanglement in respect of Haushofer and others, see John Laughland: 'The Tainted Source', page 107 ff.

¹³ Bernhard Cassen: 'La nation contra le nationalisme', LE MONDE diplomatique, March 1998, page 9.

¹⁴ Stefan Oeter: 'Humanitäre Intervention und Gewaltverbot: Wie handlungsfähig ist die Staatengemeinschaft?', chapter III: 'Der Topos vom Gewaltenmonopol der Vereinten Nationen', in: 'Einmischung erwünscht? Menschenrechte in einer Welt der Bürgerkriege', published by Hauka Bankhorst, Frankfurt a. M., 1998.

¹⁵ Munich political scientist Ernst-Otto Czerpnjel does not tire of referring to these developments. He does not like them, but he does not avoid them, either. Last reference: 'In der Realismusfalle', MERKUR No. 586, January 1998, page 15 ff.

V. Development of the situation

Which developments are to be expected?

Globalisation

What impact does globalisation have on the security of a nation and the people who live there? To what extent is globalisation a danger to liberty, independence and democracy? And to what extent does globalisation in particular increase the risk of aggression from the outside?

The term 'globalisation' designates developments that are to be found quite especially in spheres beyond politics. 'The ability of politics to impose upon human existence a reasonable and binding order is a limited one'.¹⁶

Wars no longer occur only at the place where force is applied. They are waged with the mass media-produced participation of everyone. The global significance of conflicts is a construction, local quarrels are artificially given a global significance.¹⁷ The dynamism of the conflict has again become the dominant factor in foreign policy activities. Even the integration efforts in Western Europe are nothing other than the old/new struggle to achieve a balance, albeit concealed behind a large volume of flowery declarations of unity and common interest.¹⁸

Any careful and unprejudiced review of the international scene will show that tomorrow's conflicts are linked to the following causes: national interests, national expansion, power, money, business, terrorism, oil, water, history, the quest of minorities for freedom and self-determination, religious and political ideologies, politicians striving for power and the passions of peoples.¹⁹

What does this mean for Switzerland? The globalised world will not automatically be a peaceful world for us Swiss. Distances are shrinking, the causes of conflict are getting bigger. Security policy must prophylactically ensure that Switzerland does not become the pawn of any outside power.

The future world order

We are on a long and thorny path to a multi-polar world order. No power alone can lead the whole world. I assume that America will continue to dominate the world into the new century in the military, economic, cultural, political and technology fields.

Military: Over the last 1000 years there has not been such a gap between the number 1 and the number 2.

Cultural: Zurich's education head feels it is necessary to start pupils off on English already in the lowest primary school classes. And the US influence on mass culture (films and music) is obvious.

Political: Conflict management without US participation is doomed to failure. This has become clear following actions in the Near East, the Balkans, Africa and Korea.

Technology: The coming major strategic shifts have their origin to no small extent in the increasing high-tech lead enjoyed by America.

¹⁶ Wolfgang Wegner: 'Weltgeschehen und internationale Politik' and Werner Weidenfeld: 'Ernstfall Europa', both in: 'Wegmarken eines halben Jahrhunderts', an omnibus volume of the periodical INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, Bonn, 1996, page XX and 250.

¹⁷ Ulrich Beck: 'Was ist Globalisierung?', Frankfurt a. M., 1997, page 156/157.

¹⁸ Werner Weidenfeld: 'Die Zukunftsagenda der internationalen Politik' in 'Wegmarken eines halben Jahrhunderts', Bonn, 1996, page XXIII ff.

¹⁹ William Pfaff in Letter 37/1997.

Re self-confidence: Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former presidential advisor, even refers to the Europeans as tributary vassals.²⁰ But he is well aware of the fact that the world cannot forever remain uni-polar. The recent Iraq crisis demonstrated the extent to which others – from small ‘rogue states’ (now diplomatically termed STIPS – States Threatening International Peace and Security) to regional medium-sized powers such as France and Russia to emerging giant China – are able to oppose the USA. In Europe, however, the NATO extension to the East demonstrates how very little big brother’s junior partners have to say. ‘We don’t ask, we inform’ is how this attitude was recently phrased by the US foreign secretary.

Future wars in the age of pax americana

Hegemonic powers maintain law and order. History lists a number of peace epochs and peace zones now best-known as pax romana, pax mongolica, pax britannica and pax sowjetica (which are often termed ‘periods of repression’ in the histories of the peoples thus pacified). The pax americana of the coming new century will presumably have a similar face. Taiwan, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Africa: if the USA want order, then they make order. With regard to the coming years, a pattern for the future wars in the era of pax americana can be outlined.

Wars can break out

- if and when US interests are at stake: in US opinion, material interests, protecting-power interests or domestic policy interests must be defended by way of war
- if America is not interested in a war, e.g. a civil war as in Algeria
- if the US as a global power wants to conduct a war of intervention, alone or with others (vassals), designated a ‘peace operation with peacekeeping troops’; as a rule, such wars will be against international ‘rogue states’ (STIPS) or disintegrating weak states whose internal conflicts have become a danger for others
- if and when wars are started to weaken America’s supremacy, first on a regional and subsequently on a global level
- if and when the will or the ability to play the part of a global power weakens significantly
- if and when the uni-polar order shifts to an unstable multi-polar balance. We Europeans have had quite a lot of unpleasant experience with such instabilities, which is a reason for the desperate quest for new approaches, whereby the idealists amongst us tend to apply wishful thinking in place of realistic assessment.

What are the conclusions for Switzerland?

Simply replacing the word ‘war’ with the word ‘peace’ is a futile gesture (peace troops, peace enforcement etc.). This is a typical euphemism, used to render reality more palatable. In a world with a configuration as outlined above, **Switzerland as a small nation must keep its distance** by way of a well thought-out security policy, and by going its own way. In particular, Switzerland must **keep well away from situations that could allow our country to be drawn into somebody else’s war.**

A multi-polar world?

Global power status with a right to claim co-determination in the struggle for global balance can only be exercised by nations that meet four prerequisites:

1. The **economy** must be solid enough to maintain armed forces that can intervene anywhere in the world. Nuclear weapons with intercontinental delivery systems are part of the package. This world power must be capable of surviving a first strike by another power, and of striking back.²¹

²⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski: ‘Die einzige Weltmacht. Amerikas Strategie der Vorherrschaft’, Weinheim und Berlin, 1997, page 22 and 41.

²¹ cf. ‘The Economist’, 3 January 1998, page 25

2. A nation becomes a world power if it has a **government** that is able and willing to pursue forceful foreign policies; the ability to take decisions and to act accordingly as well as the appropriate means must be on hand.

3. **The people must support the government's global power policies**, whereby a large range of motives can be the driving force: ideology, nationalism, historical-mythical, racist, economic.

4. **Vital interests must be at stake**. The world power must be genuinely dependent on the faraway events. Business, energy, migration, pressures brought to bear by one's own people, freedom of the seas can force a government to take action.

If world power status is measured by these four prerequisites, it is obvious that no new balance of world powers will emerge in the near future. Entire continents are instantly disqualified as realistic candidates (Africa, Latin America). India will be hard pressed to 'join the club'.

For a scenario situated 20 to 30 years in the future, only China, Japan, Russia and Europe can be added to the list headed by the USA, which results in a possible **pentagon of power** as outlined by a number of realists as early as just after 1991, the **multi-polar world embraced by many a politician outside of the USA**.

But this scenario too is full of **uncertainties**. The **chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction can create totally new power configurations**, technical developments can invent a completely new type of war, the possibility of radical economic shifts with strategic consequences cannot be ignored. The resolve brought to bear by governments and peoples can waver or change. The Economist on 3 January 1998, which looks at such things from a British point of view, states that a close Atlantic alliance between the USA and Europe has the best chance of success in these future power struggles – provided such an alliance is forged. And the probability of this happening in the real world may certainly be questioned.

USA and Europe: the Atlantic is getting wider

Now that the Soviet threat has disappeared, the Atlantic alliance has lost its meaning. As a consequence of the new strategic problems arising since 1991, differences between Europe and the USA are becoming increasingly visible. The Atlantic is widening. The handling of Russia, which has become more dangerous precisely because of its weakness, the support given to the Ukraine (which today receives more money from the USA than from Russia), relations with China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, the totally different configuration of interests in respect of the Southeast Asian balance of power, and in particular the controversies concerning the strategic importance of Turkey, the attempts to gain control of the oil reserves in Central Asia, all these things make the following point a valid one: **the USA and Europe are deeply divided in the most important strategic questions. The USA has a more global approach, Europe a more regional one.**²²

NATO – what now?

Up to 1989 NATO was a Western defence alliance tasked with the defence of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact armies. Now, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it has lost the job it was created for. But NATO nevertheless continues to exist – or should we say it continues to hustle and bustle along.

Impressed by all the brisk and bustling NATO officials, the Swiss visitors to Brussels fail to see **how undefined the future role of NATO really is**. The European members want to keep the USA on their continent. As an insurance policy against possible turbulence in the East, they say. What they do not say out loud – although everyone is perfectly aware of it – is that they really need an American pres-

²² Günter Gillessen: Germans and Britons lament 'ad-hocery' and harshness in 'Die Irak-Krise und Transatlantische Beziehungen', (Frankfurter Allgemeine 31-1-98).

ence to prevent Germany from achieving hegemony in Europe. **The USA on the other hand has a different agenda, and declares it openly: the new NATO is no longer an alliance for the defence of the territory of Europe; it is an instrument for the projection of US power, world-wide. NATO is a vehicle for military leadership, by America, currently on the Eurasian continent, later throughout the world. The aim: to pursue global-political law & order strategies.**²³

Madeleine Albright proposes to task NATO in the 21st century with the policing of the non-proliferation regime.²⁴ General Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO military committee and responsible for drafting the new strategy, thinks the question is now 'how a regional organisation can handle global risks'.²⁵ The issue is not the joint defence of Europe, but 'the defence of joint interests'. European members of NATO, first and foremost France, are opposed to this new role as deputy sheriffs of the USA in its role as global policeman. For little Switzerland, the vision of being a junior partner of PEACE POWER NATO with its future mission covering intervention from the Caucasus to Africa, from Korea to the South China Sea is definitely not a particularly tempting one.²⁶

The new NATO strategy currently being developed in Brussels – which is to take effect from the end of the century – has produced heated controversy. Initially heralded as a success, the Bosnia mission gave NATO a very welcome lift. It seemed that NATO had gained a new lease of life. However, the organisation's strategic direction remains undefined, and a solution is becoming increasingly difficult to find the more members NATO absorbs. 'Just as it was too early in 1991 to announce the imminent end of NATO, the jubilation about its successful transformation is probably premature (...) Fundamental differences between the United States and Europe concerning the object of NATO in the 21st century in a post-bipolar world remain; the debate has just begun.'²⁷

NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Regrettably, Switzerland's naive foreign and security policy is leading us – via the so-called Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme – into the centre of this dispute. PfP is clearly directed at rendering the NATO non-members controllable and willing to be controlled. Any nation longing to become a NATO member is offered an excellent entry point via PfP. And any nation not eager to join NATO will not be welcomed there. 'Interoperability' is the camouflage term for the development of collaborative elites, in the officer corps in particular, with the aim of ensuring that the other armies embrace US doctrine and use US equipment. A clever and successful move, to be sure – from an American viewpoint. However, alarm bells should be ringing in Swiss ears. We must remain independent, and do not want to become 'controllable'. Article 2 of the Swiss constitution and article 266 of the code of penal law remain in force. The message emanating from the defence ministry – that we simply cannot turn our back on an organisation that has peace written into its name ('for peace') – is ridiculous.

Possible developments in NATO

If the Bosnia operation (Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania?) ultimately turns out to be a successful one, the new NATO could develop into a powerful alliance which, under American dominance, could transfer more responsibility to the European members, thus taking some of the load off US shoulders – provided the Europeans are capable of accepting such responsibility on a political, financial and military level.

On the other hand, NATO could of course disintegrate – slowly and soundlessly, or rapidly and on bad terms. The NATO extension adds members that will change the political approach and the military

²³ Karl Feldmeyer: All hopes rest with NATO. Albania cannot secure its borders to Kosovo alone, (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 1-4-98).

²⁴ INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, February 1998, page 15

²⁵ DER SPIEGEL 8/1998

²⁶ Karl-Heinz Kamp: 'Eine 'globale' Rolle für die NATO?', (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2-4-1998)

²⁷ Stephan Bierling: 'Amerika führt - Europa folgt? Eine Beziehung sucht ihren Zweck', in: INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, February 1998, page 9 ff.

quality. Integration of the military structures of the new armed forces could take generations. The failure of the Baltic battalion at the 'entry test' for SFOR is a signal.²⁸

The new NATO could of course deteriorate into a feeble giant if defence budgets, training and troop numbers continue to dwindle. Domestic policy priorities can change, especially in the USA. The demographic shifts within the American population with its swiftly growing segments of inhabitants of Hispanic and Asian origin have yet to be perceived: these developments will lead to a decline in acceptance for the US-European alliance.²⁹

The new NATO might also paralyse itself in a quagmire of councils and committees, with a corresponding blurring of responsibilities; many things point to this as the most likely development. A sample: On 12 December 1997 the NATO ministers met in Brussels, and their agenda was as follows – the evening before the meeting a *Euro-Dinner* for the European members, this time reinforced by the USA and Canada. Informal discussions on Bosnia and the dispute concerning NATO's structure. Tuesday morning: *Defense Planning Committee DPC*, conventional defence matters and *Nuclear Planning Group NPG*, nuclear problems. After lunch: council of the *defence ministers*, including the French minister: defence policy matters without military planning. Evening: *additional participants*: the ministers of candidate members Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary. Wednesday: *NATO-Russia-Council* (the preparation of which currently takes up more staff time than the actual NATO meetings): tasks of the new NATO after the Cold War. *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* for all PfP members, including Switzerland. No decisions were taken on either day. Diplomatic phrases papered over the differences on Greek-Turkish collaboration, the Spanish-British dispute, the question as to who is to staff Southern Command, and how the Bosnia operation is to continue.³⁰ In addition to these NATO councils there exist innumerable internal NATO commissions, EU and WEU councils with their various types of membership, the so-called Bosnia contact group which acts as if it were a Europe-directorate, the OSCE councils, the Weimar Triangle Poland-France-Germany, the *special relationship* of Messrs Kohl, Jelzin and Chirac, and, created in 1998, the Europe-conference that now debates matters concerning security policy, too – and so forth. **One does not have to be a professional soldier to doubt whether armies can be commanded within such structures in a war situation.**

It is an open secret that the reality of German-French military co-operation is far removed from the rhetoric fed to the public.³¹ The NATO mission in Bosnia is eating away at army budgets in France and Germany, too. The PfP activities, especially the joint exercises, are a further drain on financial resources. Necessary hardware investments are being shelved. The difficult-to-reconcile structures of the military systems in Germany and France place a question mark over the serviceability of the Euro-corps. Four highest-ranking French generals have resigned for exactly these reasons. **In France, belief in the Europeanisation of NATO has dwindled.**³²

For Switzerland, all this clearly means that, taking into account these possible developments and the uncertainties involved, Switzerland as a small nation must carefully follow the development of NATO, but it certainly should not tie itself to NATO with naive expectations in what the future will bring, neither by way of direct membership nor via an increasing commitment within Partnership for Peace. To restrict one's own freedom of action at such a point in time would be irresponsible.

²⁸ Is the Baltic peace battalion ready for action?', NZZ, 9 January 1998, page 5.

²⁹ Philip H. Gordon (ed.): 'NATO's Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance', New York, 1997.

³⁰ The concluding communiqué is printed in full in the official quarterly publication *NATO Review No. 1*, Spring 1998, page D 1 ff. The publication also contains the annual plan 1998 – 2000 for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

³¹ Lothar Rühl: 'Little co-operation between Bonn and Paris, reduced perspectives for military co-operation', NZZ, 6 February 1998.

³² Poudrières [magazines] de la planète', *Manière de voir* 37, janvier-février 1998, a collection of articles from LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, in particular: Michael Klare: 'Quand Washington repense sa stratégie militaire', page 10 ff.

'L'Europe n'existe pas'³³

In connection with security policy, the EU must be looked at exclusively from a security viewpoint, i.e. with regard to defence strategy and joint defence policy.

The EU is faced by distribution conflicts, control conflicts, power conflicts.³⁴ Financing, agriculture policy, concentration of the structure funds and reforming of the institutions: there is no lack of technocratic constructions, but there is a lack of democratic legitimisation and transparent decision-making mechanisms. And, of special interest in this context, there is no joint foreign and security policy. The EU has only a limited capability to govern and to act.³⁵ Fundamental strategy questions remain unresolved, the boundaries of members' willingness to integrate were apparent in Amsterdam.³⁶ The European security system, grandly termed 'architecture', is ineffectual. From a defence policy viewpoint, Europe remains a protectorate, remains dependent on US protection and US interests. Europe will neither be united by globalisation nor by monetary union.

This Europe is consistently losing coherence. The old guiding principles of integration are being reduced to the status of museum exhibits.³⁷ Concentric circles, variable geometry, graduated integration, federal state, confederation: who can remember all this? Because the central idea is missing, the EU is losing itself in the contradictions of everyday politics. The ever-louder call for 'WORLD POWER EUROPE' to be certified as the new central concept makes us wonder whether the future can be anything but gloomy. Here, too, the idealistic notions of the early nineties have been trampled in the dust, the traditional military-alliance mode of thinking is emerging, meaning that NATO is again gaining in importance. In this context, PfP is not an expression of collectivism but of the old-style military-alliance way of thinking. The path outlined above leads from the romanticism of the years of change to the realism of tomorrow. Countries have a strong 'partner' to lean on, but the individual nations retain their own responsibilities. As has become apparent over the past years, the international system is not capable of resolving or limiting conflicts.³⁸

'Europe' wants too much, too fast. 'European overload' is the diagnosis. The idea that an armed and neutral Switzerland would have a safe haven within this Europe, that Switzerland would be protected from dangers it could not confront at source and that would be difficult to deal with, is an illusion.

And Russia?

Russia will have a significant influence on the future of Europe, for better or for worse. Should it become a junior partner of the Americans, in spite of everything that transpired in the past? Should it keep its distance, i.e. become a focus of power in its own right, attracting all the nations that have problems with the West, such as, at the moment, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Serbia? For economic reasons alone this is nonsensical. In my opinion, Russia has to develop its relations with the West, and to deal independently with China and Asia. For German industry, Russia represented a strategic reserve, and in the eyes of America, Russia was a rival; this will presumably remain the same. Russia will not go under. Its economic and intellectual potential, its atomic weapons and its permanent membership in the UN Security Council can save Russia in the difficult years of development – provided it does not implode. And once Russia has recovered, its army, navy and air force will again play a significant role in the concert of world powers.

³³ This phrase ['Switzerland does not exist'] was posted at the last World Exhibition in Seville, as a lampooning of Switzerland by the Swiss themselves; the same phrase is now being used by the EU. Ignacio Ramonet: 'Leçons d'une guerre', LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1998.

³⁴ Josef Manning and Claus Gierig: 'Mythos der Erweiterungsfähigkeit. Die EU vor ihrer ersten Osterweiterung.' INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, November 1997, page 31.

³⁵ Eberhard Rhein: 'Europäische Union à 25, wie regierbar ist sie?' INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, November 1997, page 25.

³⁶ Michael Stürmer, NZZ on 4 January 1998, on the strategic disorientation of the EU.

³⁷ Werner Weidenfeld in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 3 November 1997.

³⁸ Shlomo Avineri: 'Konfliktlösung in der Demokratie, von altem Versagen und neuen Chancen', in: 'Demokratie am Wendepunkt. Die demokratische Frage als Projekt des 21. Jahrhunderts', published by Werner Weidenfeld, Berlin, 1996.

The notion that Europe is currently the EU, and nothing else, is somewhat elementary. In the Europe of the coming decades there will be place for a wide variety of states – and not only for NATO and EU members. Neutral Switzerland will make its contribution to stability not by hanging onto the coattails of other states, but by safeguarding its stability and by proceeding on its sovereign path in a straightforward and predictable manner.

VI. Peace and security

One aspect is particularly apparent, in the overall security policy discussion in general, and extensively in the Brunner report: the concept of peace and security has been denigrated. Even in places where war is being waged, the favoured terminology is 'construction sites for peace'. Instead of speaking of threats, the term 'security zone' is used, and so forth. The terms must be defined if they are to be used in any strategic study.

Peace

Peace is more than just the absence of war. War can be suppressed, but enduring and successful peace cannot be rammed down anyone's throat. Peace is not an end in itself. Peace is not an objective, but a staging post on the way to more. This is also a reason for the failure of many a well-meaning intervention. What comes next is what counts. This positive peace must be distinguished from a solely negative peace.³⁹ Political solutions must put down roots in the peoples concerned. Military interventions with limited goals and short time frames hardly ever lead to lasting peace. Objectives of a completely different kind are often concealed behind the peacemaking pretext: **in the final analysis, every war is waged for the subsequent peace, even the wars of aggression.** The pet idea of highbrow political scientists – that it is a law of nature that the outcome of democracy is eternal peace – may be termed one of the new myths of the discipline of peace research.⁴⁰ **A special case of successful peace does however exist: special case Switzerland.** If we take a look today at the peace zone of the rich OECD world, Switzerland catches one's eye as the one country in Europe that can look back on the longest period of peace.⁴¹ **Open to the world, armed to demonstrate the nation's determination to remain its own master, with the courage to limit one's presence on the global political stage: Switzerland has a recipe for peace that is the envy of other countries.**

Security

In spite of all the gloomy predictions, we feel less threatened by military aggression than ever before. No enemy is in sight. But a strong sense of security has its risks, in politics as in everyday life.⁴² It can lead to overconfidence and an exaggerated willingness to take more risks. Security is not an end-all; the security zones as defined in the Brunner report hence do not exist. Security is a guideline that should accompany our actions. The quest for security can have a paralysing effect. **A good security policy therefore seeks to establish a balance between security and risk; risk because there is no life and no progress without it, security because we need protection against unwelcome surprises.** A false sense of security can originate from self-overestimation, from ignorance of the dangers and from a lack of experience. The Swiss security policy is in danger of falling into this trap. We overestimate our potential to bring peace to the world within the framework of the UN and NATO or even the OSCE. We fail to see future hazards. We have no first-hand experience of war; hence we fail to view armed conflict with the respect it deserves. The vision of a Swiss soldier marching off to a foreign civil war with a sidearm for his personal protection is a romantic caricature and an expression of crass ignorance of the realities. We need to be more aware of the terrible nature of armed conflict and its consequences for soldiers and non-combatants alike. One of the principal duties of the government is to organise the nation so that it is protected from outside force. Yellow berets, solidarity troops and similar inventions are misguided reactions to the currently prevailing sense of security.

³⁹ A selection of more recent literature: Volker Matthies (ed.): 'Der gelungene Frieden. Beispiele und Bedingungen erfolgreicher Konfliktbewältigung', Bonn, 1997. Dieter Senghaas (ed.): 'Frieden machen', Frankfurt a.M., 1997. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (ed.): 'Frieden durch Recht', Frankfurt a.M., 1996.

⁴⁰ Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.): 'Debating the Democratic Peace', London, 1996, depicts the entire scope of the debate. Reinhard Merkel und Roland Wittmann (eds.): 'Zum ewigen Frieden. Grundlagen, Aktualität und Ausichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant', Frankfurt a.M., 1996. The critical opinions are missing here, and in particular the numerous texts written outside of Germany are not included.

⁴¹ Karl W. Deutsch: 'Die Schweiz als friedenspolitisches Lehrstück; Integration als Friedensgemeinschaft', in: Volker Matthies (ed.): 'Der gelungene Friede', Bonn, 1997, page 65 ff.

⁴² Felix von Cube: 'Gefährliche Sicherheit. Die Verhaltensbiologie des Risikos', Stuttgart, 1995.

VII. Warfare of the future – the last war will not repeat itself

So what should a **future** security policy cover? What dangers must the army of the future be trained to deal with? Obviously, the answers to these questions necessitate an assessment of the future. To simply base predictions on a linear projection of the present (which is what the Brunner report does) is dangerous. **One thing is for sure, though: the last war will not repeat itself. The armed conflicts we see today do however afford us a glimpse of what warfare could be like in the future.**

The asymmetrical war

Armed to the teeth, troops are facing each other in the Persian Gulf in a new-type **asymmetrical warfare** scenario: the high-tech and seemingly overwhelmingly powerful nuclear global power which (we assume) enjoys superiority in the air, on the water and on the ground, and which has an arsenal of new weapons at its disposal, some of which have yet to be tested in a real battlefield situation, meets the decimated army of a small-scale dictator of a weakened nation who may have stocks of weapons of mass destruction hidden away somewhere, which he could have smuggled by terrorist units into any country and any city to cause unquantifiable damage there. Slingshot versus sword, David against Goliath. The pattern is not new, but is particularly menacing in its latest form.

What does this mean for Switzerland? We must learn to deal with violence other than meted out by modern and well-equipped armies that are bound by the provisions of international law.

The civil war

In Kosovo, a **typical war of secession** may be developing. A minority wants to gain independence from a despised majority, if necessary by force, and to become a majority in a smaller territory. Historical enmities that are difficult to comprehend from the outside flare up. The problems surrounding the right of self-determination – which remain unresolved both in practice and in theory – heighten the fear of the neighbouring states of a rapid spread of the armed uprising throughout the region, into Turkey and to Greece (two NATO members), to Macedonia and beyond. The medium-sized European powers talk a lot but do next to nothing; the traditional relationship between Russia and Serbia causes divisions in the councils of the UN and NATO. Religious-cultural frontiers re-emerge. Satellites and cruise missiles are useless. If war breaks out it will be a barbaric one, conducted with kalashnikovs and knives. In Switzerland, thousands of Albanians and Kosovo-Albanians demonstrate in Berne, Zurich and Geneva, most of them young men without a job. The Serbs living in Switzerland organise counter-demonstrations.

The risk of civil wars of this kind being borne into Switzerland as a result of migration is high. No matter what success is achieved on the diplomatic front, or by the major powers: these new dangers of internal violence must be confronted.

Commercialised wars of new mercenaries

Sierra Leone recently experienced a military intervention by West African peace troops under Nigerian leadership. Last time, order was restored in the same country by a **private army**. There have been calls for a repeat performance; the private army left an excellent and disciplined impression. Harbingers of a dangerous development with consequences that cannot be assessed at this point in time, of a new mercenary age? Private firms in South Africa, England and the USA offer professional services: military advice, doctrine formulation, training, battlefield control (with state-of-the-art equipment if required), logistics during and after the conflict, intelligence services (including satellite reconnaissance), protection of humanitarian organisations, protection of persons, protection of threatened extraction and industrial plants (especially in Africa), crime prevention, assistance in hostage situations. Firms such as *Executive Outcomes*, *Military Professional Resources Inc.* and others are well-known organi-

sations. They employ former professional soldiers of all ranks ('rent a general'). Business is booming, not only in drug-producing countries and in Africa, but also in Bosnia. A growth market is being created before our very eyes. Security services normally provided by the armed and police forces are being outsourced, to the detriment of the state. **The state monopoly on the use of force – once afforded highest priority in the interest of the nation's citizens – is being eroded in a most improvident manner, and is in danger of collapsing.** Private security is difficult to control. Highly paid Swiss volunteers on armed military peace missions somewhere in the world? ⁴³

Obviously, such 'private armies' can be hired by government and private contractors alike. **Switzerland cannot have any interest whatsoever in eroding the foundations of the state monopoly on the use of force. If it were to fall, we would find ourselves back in the dark ages of robber barons and governed by the law of the jungle. Those responsible for the police and armed forces should not forget these points.**

The information war

The rich industrial nations that are entering into the information age are preparing for a new type of warfare, the **information war**. One of the elements in this context is **network warfare, or cyberwar**. New vulnerabilities are revolutionising the face of war. ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ However, in scenarios of this kind the small but highly sophisticated nation does have the possibility to hit back with similar weapons, and to defend itself against attempted extortion.

A great deal is being written and discussed in connection with these new aspects; at the moment, though, the experts are discovering more problems than solutions. In this situation, sober assessment is called for. If it were so easy to paralyse an enemy with the instruments of cyberwar, it would have happened in Iraq. Many aspects are technologies of the future, but the new threat is a real one, work is progressing and we must keep up with these developments. For a highly developed small state such as Switzerland, cyberwarfare offers new defence and counterstroke options, opportunities to convincingly let potential aggressors and extortionists know that their losses would exceed any benefits. **The old maxim of the high admission price can be filled with new content**, provided we maintain a spirit of innovation, the qualities of the militia are put to best use (in which skilled hackers will also be welcome), and the defence chiefs provide target-oriented leadership. **New equipment, new troops, new training are required.** The army is well aware of this. The Swiss chancellery recently held a strategy seminar dealing with these topics; incredibly, without broad army participation. This is not the way to do things. **The national defence policy of the future – regardless of what it may be called – must ensure appropriate networking, not only between army and administrative bodies, but with business, too. The army with its broad experience in the field of electronic warfare must act as senior partner; it has, after all, always been tasked with warding off aggression from the outside.**

⁴³ The problem has many angles. In 'Private Armies and Military Intervention', Adelphi Paper 316, London, 1998, David Shearer warns against superficial indignation. As a consequence of the declining willingness to provide the UN with troops to intervene in civil wars such as Rwanda, Somalia etc. he sees peace- and stability-promoting opportunities provided the 'private army' is properly used. However, I feel that we Swiss should not participate in this trend by means of state-sanctioned volunteer units.

⁴⁴ Eliot A. Cohen: 'A Revolution in Military Affairs', FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1996. Charles Grant: 'America's ever mightier might', in 'The World in 1998', The Economist Publications, London, 1997, page 71. Paul Dibb: 'The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security', Survival London Winter 1997/1998, page 93. Roger C. Molander et al.: 'Strategic Information Warfare. A New Face of War', RAND, Santa Monica/CA, 1996.

⁴⁵ Jamie F. Metz: 'Information Intervention. When Switching Channels Isn't Enough', FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December 1997, page 15 ff.

World wars of new interlinkage

At this point in time, nobody can predict the strategic consequences of the banking, financial and economic crises in Asia. Alert observers can make out new patterns of global conflagration – patterns that could require the deployment of armed forces. The corresponding scenarios have been outlined.⁴⁶ The Brunner commission is wrong to close its eyes to the possibility of **world wars**. It remains stranded in the concepts of World War 2 and the Cold War. Globalisation produces new risks of world-wide armed conflicts of a totally new kind. In this context, **neutrality has a fresh significance for the future**, because neutrality is a maxim that is recognised all over the world, that reaches beyond the adjacent states. But neutrality is credible only if it is dependable. And neutrality is dependable if it is enduringly and consistently applied.

Conventional wars

The arms markets are flourishing, albeit in a highly competitive environment. A lot of money is being invested in research and development, the products are being bought. In the Near East and Asia, for example, many a political visit is organised with the principal objective of securing lucrative orders for the nation's arms industry. The presence of US weapons manufacturers in the NATO candidate states of Eastern Europe has elicited critical comment from people who are neither familiar with the arms industry nor blessed with an adequately realistic view of the situation. Russia has downsized its high-flying plans to convert its armament factories into manufacturing sites for more peaceful goods. Military hardware of the latest generation has become an important element of foreign trade. The possibility of **conventional war** cannot be ignored. Know-how and materials are on hand. Regardless of all the new threats, a close eye must be kept on these developments, too.

Summary: wars of a new kind

We have outlined half a dozen new faces of warfare:

- Asymmetrical war against rogue nations with virtual weapons of mass destruction which could be used also to blackmail Switzerland
- Civil wars in weak, disintegrating and quasi-countries, which are carried into our country on the back of migration
- Commercialised wars waged by new mercenaries, which undermine the state monopoly on the use of force
- Information wars waged on a high-tech level
- Wars of new networking that can turn into global conflicts
- Conventional wars with redeveloped and new weapons used side by side with old armaments

The search for solutions

Throughout the world answers are being sought; strategic study groups are at work all over the place, usually applying a great deal of **highly professional** effort and resources to the task. But politicians cannot wait – they have to act (or not act) in dozens of ongoing conflicts. To date, political prowess has been unable to find satisfactory solutions. The international organisations are a long way away from keeping their promises. **The notion that problems that cannot be resolved alone could be solved jointly with others – that Swiss membership in the UN, EU, WEU and NATO could provide greater security in the world described above – is extremely difficult to follow;** after all, precisely these institutions are the ones that are unable to find a way forward.

⁴⁶ Humphrey Hawksley & Simon Holberton: 'Dragon Strike. The Millennium War', London, 1997. Caspar Weinberger & Peter Schweizer: 'The Next War', Washington, 1996. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro: 'The Coming Conflict with China', New York, 1997 (a subject of controversy in the USA).

Why Switzerland should give up its self-defence capabilities and its neutrality in the face of these dangers is totally incomprehensible – these are the only things that can be of avail in this situation. It is true that our army is ill prepared to meet numerous types of threats. The army must adapt to the changing threats. Switzerland is relatively ill equipped to counter **third-party civil wars that erupt in our country** (the remorseless battles on the ground) and **international organised crime**, aspects that are rightly mentioned in the Brunner report.

This must be changed; the army heads must be given scope to adjust their decisions to the current threats. I am convinced that this can be achieved in a relatively simple process – provided all efforts are concentrated on these goals, and not on trivialities. The time when action could be based on pre-compiled blueprints is long gone. Flexibility in the heads of commanders and staffs is required, the good military college or training course must on a regular basis teach students how to master extraordinary and unexpected situations. This is a prerequisite for confidence in our army.

VIII. Weapons of mass destruction – weapons also of the weak

Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons are no longer the weapons of the powerful, but of the weak, too. They are no longer leading edge technologies, they have become primitive means of destruction. Disarmament and arms control have – unjustifiably – become less important. One of the reasons for this development may be that in today's world it is easier to reach an international agreement, but that very little progress is being made in the destruction of the huge stockpiles still in place. **Chemical warfare**, which traces back to Ypres in the Great War and was seen in Auschwitz and Treblinka, in the Gulf War and in Tokyo (the 20th century is termed the poison gas century),⁴⁷ has left us with enormous stocks of toxic waste on our hands. Their destruction within a reasonable time is being hampered by a lack of suitable disposal plants and adequate funding. And things get worse: we must expect agents of this kind to be used not in World War 1-style trench warfare, but in the cities of the major powers and their allies. These thoughts give a further boost to the strategy of non-involvement, of avoidance of being caught up in the wars of other nations.

In this light, i.e. as a means of escaping from extortion attempts, neutrality gains a completely new significance.

Nuclear weapons are now being studied by the strategy experts under the general heading 'virtual nuclear arsenals'⁴⁸ The strategic effects of the mere possibility of a party possessing nuclear weapons are significant. Israel, South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan are worrying the experts. If the US security guarantees for Japan, Taiwan and Germany should ever be cancelled, there is a risk that certain nations will start assessing the new situation with a freshly acquisitive eye. Such weapons that may or may not be a part of a nation's arsenal – do they upset or stabilise the balance of a region? We can be sure that virtual nuclear arsenals (and presumably also biological and chemical arsenals) have a future. Effective controls are not in sight.

What does this mean for Switzerland, a country that neither has nor wishes to have nuclear weapons? **On the one hand, Switzerland must maintain its neutrality to reduce the danger of attack, and on the other hand Switzerland must take measures to protect its civilian population.**

Biological weapons are today seen as being the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. The current asymmetrical conflict with Iraq has triggered a wave of concern in America: people suddenly realised that civil defence in the major cities has been grossly neglected. The consequence: vulnerability. Work to remedy the situation has been initiated; these efforts are however encountering serious obstacles. **In Switzerland, civil defence has been afforded high priority in the years following the last world war. To dismantle the system now, even in part, would be foolhardy. But it must be adapted to the new dangers. Protection of the people against biological, chemical and nuclear weapons must be given high priority; the civil defence organisation needs an innovation boost, too. Many aspects are in place, for example the shelters, but reorganisation is required.**

⁴⁷ Till Bastian: 'Unser Giftgasjahrhundert', UNIVERSITAS, January 1998, page 78 ff.

⁴⁸ Avner Cohen and Joseph F. Pilat: 'Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals', Survival, London, Spring 1998, page 129 ff.

IX. Humanitarian intervention – a contradiction in itself

The intervention boom of the early nineties is receding; 'end or change' is the motto.⁴⁹ It still feeds armies of civil servants, consultants, private aid organisations, media reporters and travelling politicians – in Switzerland, too. But the judgement of independent observers is harsh: **'Humanitarian armed intervention is an impossibility; it has never existed, even when it was attempted. Participation from the outside in third-party conflicts is always one of two things: either intervention (and hence a political taking of sides) or a non-partisan humanitarian operation.'**⁵⁰ Professor Gillissen appropriately describes the central weakness of military interventionism with a humanitarian and limited combat assignment. **If you shoot you automatically become a combatant.** If you come armed, i.e. with a political brief, you are assuming order-restoring or order-maintaining functions. The party must know what kind of order he wishes to restore, and who shall ultimately govern. He must address the roots of the conflict. Conversely, a party providing humanitarian aid has different goals: to alleviate misery and suffering. Such help is never forced upon the people.⁵¹ ICRC president Cornelio Sommaruga has long lamented the increasing politicisation of humanitarian aid. The distribution of aid supplies should not be the job of armed troops tasked with restoring law and order. Otherwise we would experience a repeat of what happened in Bosnia, where UN troops tolerated the massacre of civilians whilst protecting the perpetrators. International law is thus reduced to absurdity.⁵² Richard N. Haass takes an even tougher stance in respect of the regimen of sanctions that is increasingly being embraced by the Swiss government.⁵³ He writes of the 'madness of sanctions'. To avoid the deployment of troops, and to nevertheless 'do something', more and more states, constituent states and international organisations are imposing economic sanctions (from 1993 to 1996, America alone punished 35 states by imposing economic sanctions), arms embargoes, development aid cuts, import restrictions, freezing of assets, customs duties hikes, revocation of most-favoured-nation clauses, are voting against the relevant state in international organisations, discontinuing diplomatic relations, refusing visa applications, suspending air travel, blocking loans and other financial services, and banning investment. The intervention arsenal sports a wide range of weapons, but they are extensively ineffective. They hit the wrong targets: the people instead of the government. Results are late in coming, if they ever do. Hypocrisy, selective perception of grievances, the CNN syndrome: the list of charges is a long one. It would be a mistake for Switzerland to belatedly join this party, too. The clear-cut segregation of politics and humanitarian aid is necessary, possible and successful. The ICRC not only looks back on a great history, it will be more useful than ever in the future. The Swiss disaster aid corps may have a name that should perhaps be changed to reflect more appropriately the range of services it provides. In 1997 it was deployed 222 times in 43 countries (11 European and CIS, 16 African, 9 Asian and 7 Central and South American), a fact only acknowledged by the media on the occasion of its anniversary celebrations.⁵⁴ Switzerland would certainly be the ideal home for a well-developed organisation of this kind. Only a small neutral state – i.e. a country that can approach other states without triggering mistrust, that is evidently neither partisan nor seeking to expand its power – can credibly provide this kind of aid. We do not need armed solidarity soldiers; what we do need is this corps with its 25 years of experience, an organisation that provides help when and where needed. We do not need rivalries between two ministries for money, personnel and media presence, nor do we need two sets of administrative and management bodies. The Swiss foreign ministry is well-equipped to provide civilian humanitarian aid. If it is the right thing to do, and if the people agree, even more can be done. There are plenty of tasks to be tackled in places where no shooting is going on. The current linkage with PFP is unfortunate in every respect. And it should be noted in this context that good will and good intentions cannot be an excuse for flawed concepts. More often than not, meaning well is the opposite of good! **Solidarity: yes – but in the right way, through impartial aid provided where it is needed, without haphazard political and military interference.**

⁴⁹ Ramses 1998. 'Synthèse annuelle de l'évolution du monde', Institut des relations internationales, Paris, 1997, page 138.

⁵⁰ Günther Gillissen: 'Mythos humanitäre Intervention. Ein Holzweg der internationalen Politik', INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, September 1997, page 13.

⁵¹ Ben Barber: 'Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid', FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 1997, page 8.

⁵² Most recently in: Basler Zeitung, 13 March 1998.

⁵³ Richard N. Haass: 'Sanctioning Madness', FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December 1997, page 74.

⁵⁴ SKH-Journal 1/98.

X. Conclusions for Switzerland

Objectives and how to achieve them

The world is characterised by change. It is a world also of power struggles and violence. Switzerland is a part of this world, privileged by geography and history, a prosperous and small nation. On the threshold to the new century, Switzerland needs a strategy that will allow it to retain its **freedom, independence and democracy** as traditionally defined by its people. These cornerstones of our nation are more important than any obscure 'collective security'. Strategic concepts and decisions must be measured against these three values. The strategy is characterised by **independence, openness to the world, self-assertion, voluntary restriction of our presence on the international stage, courage and the willingness to take risks**. We are not controllable, neither by global powers, regional powers or international organisations. Our principal means of defence are **our permanent neutrality as a foreign policy maxim, diplomacy, the armed forces, the civil defence organisation and the state security services as instruments to ward off aggression and to protect the people of our country**.

Flexibility

Situations can develop in many different directions. We must therefore keep our options open, so that we can respond with flexibility and in our own responsibility. A policy that restricts its own scope of freedom through inherent pressures must be avoided.

Self-restriction

Our interests are better served through reticence in the foreign policy field than by activism and showmanship. Non-partisanship is the right approach for a small nation.

Role model

The fundamental task remains the same: to provide the best-possible framework for the people of our country to live in. 'To become like Switzerland is our great national dream' – this was said by Asher Akajew, president of the Central Asian republic of Kirgistan on the occasion of the state visit of the German federal president at the end of January 1998.⁵⁵ Over the past years numerous new and small states have come into being, often smaller than Switzerland. Some of them are in difficulties. To act as a role model, to show them that it is possible to co-exist with larger nations in peace and prosperity, without relinquishing control of one's own destiny, is certainly a task worth taking seriously. We know we are facing a number of very serious problems: unemployment, the national debt, the social insurances, and so forth. **These are problems we – and we alone – must solve. We must concentrate our forces on, and restrict ourselves to, finding the best solutions.**

Aggression in our own country

At this point in time, there is no foreign army in sight that could want to forcibly take away from us our central values freedom, independence and democracy. The only dangers in this respect could arise from our own negligence, from an over-exuberant urge to join the others, from defeatism. The aggression that must be countered by the armed forces now has a new face. **In particular, the information war, brutal aggression on the ground** if an outside civil war should be carried into Switzerland, and the threat posed by **weapons of mass destruction used by rogue states**.

⁵⁵ 'Die Welt', 30 January 1998.

Information war

For a defensive and counter-attacking **information war**, **Switzerland needs a small professional unit that can be reinforced with militia specialists**. It must have modern equipment and maintain close ties with business and universities, to enable the unit to keep up with developments in this field. The heads – both civilian and military – must be familiar with strategies, technologies and tactics for these new weapons, and they must be able to set and achieve targets and to provide leadership for these instruments.

Fighting on the ground

We need a large number of troops to deal with aggression on the ground, equipped with modern (and also non-lethal) weapons and trained in urban combat. These units require support in the air and on the ground, plus the appropriate logistical services. This is not a police force, but a redevelopment of the territorial infantry, **a militia that is only called up when needed**, stiffened by professional soldiers that ensure top-quality training. **Unit strengths must be large enough to provide scope for intervention even if fighting between hostile ethnic groupings should break out simultaneously in several places within Switzerland, and to ensure that reinforcements can be prevented from crossing the Swiss frontier**. Relief units must be on hand. The troops must be familiar with the towns and cities they operate in, and they must be used to operating in close collaboration with authorities and local services.⁵⁶ **These tasks can only be performed by a militia that could, if and when necessary, field a large number of troops who are familiar with their theatre of operation**. Militia troops will only be called up if and when an emergency arises.

No specific enemy

The army does not have to prepare for a specific enemy. It must train for the conflict situations that could arise. In a state of emergency the government must be able to count on armed forces that are capable of mastering unexpected problems, too. **Combat must be the core competency**. The army must not lose its combat ability in semi-military experiments at home and abroad. The army is not a free support service for commercial sports events, nor is it a salvation army-style organisation. The negative experience of the US military with loss of combat effectiveness as a result of peacekeeping and PfP operations speaks for itself, and should not be swept under the carpet.⁵⁷

An armed Switzerland

The Swiss people must remain armed to meet situations of this kind. **The world must know that the Swiss are determined to assert their rights**. The militia system provides the appropriate framework. Army strengths must be regulated via the age groups (years of birth) called into service. An optimally broad scope of basic training is indispensable.

Open to the world

Openness to the world does not mean that we have to copy others, or even become 'interoperable' and fall into line with the others. It means keeping one's eyes open over a broad horizon to see what is going on, maintaining controlled and target-oriented contacts, measuring one's own level against those of the others, yet always remaining self-assured and distanced. If a fight cannot be avoided, secrecy and deception is needed to be able to surprise the opponents. Openness can be dangerous if

⁵⁶ Ralph Peters: 'Our Soldiers, Their Cities', Parameter, Spring 1996.

⁵⁷ Richard J. Newman: 'Can Peacekeepers Make War?' US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 29, 1998. The answer is NO. The claim that foreign service as blue and yellow berets would strengthen the combat effectiveness of the Swiss army is a false one.

it leads to the disclosure of secrets, or to guileless fraternisation, if foreign 'experts' are granted access to command centres or even allowed to take part in top-level command exercises. 'Confidence-building measures' via multinational military tourism are ridiculous. The defence ministry must get the foreign contacts of our officers back under better control.

Weapons of mass destruction

Civil defence and army services must be prepared for new tasks: **to help protect the inhabitants of our country if new-type weapons of mass destruction should ever be used in our country**, or if **the consequences of major disasters** (Chernobyl) have to be dealt with. **The maxim is adjustment, not reduction.** Nobody can prevent disasters of this kind from happening, but the effects can be significantly reduced. Strong impulses are urgently needed in the very near future.

National security

The **state security services** must be given the means to protect us **against the dangers of international crime.** The neutrality status is in effect also an obligation not to allow our country to become a source of danger, neither for us nor for others. This cannot be achieved unless the relevant services are developed accordingly. The army does not need new special police units. **Like the other police services, the military police must be developed and if necessary expanded to meet the changing face of threats.**

The danger of foreign civil wars being fought also on Swiss territory is a growing one. Without a comprehensive intelligence service we run the risk of falling victim to surprise events with all the possible disastrous consequences. The risk cannot be ignored of Switzerland experiencing provocation and terrorist acts within its own borders, either to internationalise a foreign civil war or as a response to our 'taking the wrong side'.

The notion of Switzerland joining the Schengen agreement and opening its borders at this point in time is truly an adventurous one. Our border controls must be tightened, not relaxed, also to help combat the rising number of foreign criminals 'touring' Switzerland.

Neutrality

If neutrality did not exist, now would be the time to invent it. Keeping out of other peoples' business has never been easier or more important. **Joining a major power's war against a rogue state that could use weapons of mass destruction means opening the door for disaster to strike at home.**

Like the EU membership plans of the Swiss government and the Brunner commission, neutrality is neither an objective nor an end in itself. **Neutrality is the diplomatic instrument that can help insulate a small nation from the pressures and demands of foreign powers, from the push to 'go along'.** It shields the people from enthusiasm for war and tendencies to aspire to major power status. Neutrality was hence always more securely rooted in the people than in the leading politicians and top military officers. In addition, neutrality provides a platform for **easy access to the suffering, to the survivors in war zones.** Neutrality is the best foundation for genuine solidarity, and also provides scope – provided a qualified foreign policy is being pursued – for active participation in conciliation procedures.

Anyone declaring that neutrality has become a principle of the past is looking back to World War 2 and the Cold War. At that time, this type of neutrality was important. However, neutrality in this form is no longer appropriate. **Tomorrow's neutrality is a generic attitude basing on non-participation and non-intervention, and on participation in humanitarian aid (not intervention).** It prohibits the currently re-emerging military-alliance philosophy. Obviously, neutrality cannot protect us against missiles, but maintaining neutrality means that potential aggressors are less tempted to attack Switzerland with missiles. The risk of inadequate protection against missiles has been a fact of

life for all nations for decades. Is there an alliance that safeguards its inhabitants from missiles? Can any major power do so? The coercive strike against Switzerland from North Africa is one of the oldest shelf-warmers in the Swiss army's training exercise scenario book; it can be used anywhere in the world.

Neutrality, if it is to be credibly underpinned, must be armed and ready to meet the dangers of the future: information war and brutal aggression on the ground. Neutrality can only be credible if our representatives vouch for it in all their foreign contacts, and actively ensure that misunderstandings do not arise. The ongoing erosion as advocated in the Brunner report and currently pursued by the defence ministry in an almost unbearable and self-important manner – step by step, under the pretext of wanting to expand one's 'latitude' even further – is seen by the people for what it is – a cheap trick – and is contributing to the growing alienation of the people from its government. And it would be especially bad if this loss of confidence would spread to the army leadership, too.

It is by no means a new phenomenon that politicians and top military staff tend to lean towards abolishing neutrality whenever the threat of war is deemed extremely small. This is a sign not of special courage, but of immaturity, of convenience, of dreams of becoming a major power. History proves this point.⁵⁸ **In more recent history, the call for abolition of neutrality was heard before World War 1, between the World Wars – and recently again.** This is understandable, because neutrality restricts the scope of activity of government and army alike. 'Exertion of influence' on an international scale, military alliances with all their temptations, the desire to be a 'major player', neutrality is a spanner in the works of all these things. Neutrality is not a comfortable bed to lie in, because it requires constant explanation, and because if one is neutral one might not be anyone's enemy, but one is not anyone's friend, either.⁵⁹

Neutrality is deeply anchored in large parts of the Swiss population, not only because it is co-responsible for the last 150 years of peace in our country, but also due to the simple fact that neutrality is the best foreign policy maxim for the security of our country. In the face of the new threats, neutrality once again gains in significance.

Armed troops abroad

If you send a limited number of troops abroad on a limited-time mission, you will be drawn into endless follow-on operations. The yellow berets, acting as orderlies for OSCE officials, are a good example in this context: initially they were supposed to stay for one year, then for two, now the time frame is open-ended ('We really can't recall them now!'). The bizarre Korea mission headed by a bogus divisional commander has been stuck in place for more than four decades ('We really can't recall them now!'). In the Western Sahara, a *Swiss Medical Unit* waited for a long time in the sand for a ballot that would never take place, or at least not for a very long time. (They were able to be recalled, just before the Swiss voters had to decide on 'blue berets yes or no'.)

The Swiss voters have rejected the notion of deploying armed Swiss troops abroad, a shrewd decision, as confirmed by events. The sidearms currently requested (for personal protection) would soon have to be supplemented by heavier weapons, from light machine guns to APCs, from Stingers to battle helicopters and anti-missile systems – after all, one has to be able to respond to what all the others have. **A pistol in one's hand is a step in the wrong direction, and will ultimately lead to NATO membership; some people see this as a desirable development.**

The Brunner commission says the yellow berets are expected to be armed. This is wrong. The Swiss Ambassador at the OSCE stated unambiguously that **'the OSCE wants the yellow berets to perform their duties unarmed.'**⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Georges-André Chevallaz: 'Die Herausforderung der Neutralität', Zürich, 1997

⁵⁹ Also see: Christoph Blocher: 'Die Schweiz und der Eisenstat-Bericht', published by AUNS, the campaign for an independent and neutral Switzerland, Berne, 1997, page 5 ff.

⁶⁰ Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift ASMZ, February 1998, page 15.

The Brunner commission demands – in full agreement with the defence ministry – an armed special unit for missions abroad. The experience of our neighbours shows that a threefold number of troops is needed for foreign deployment: one third is on duty, one third is training, one third is preparing for the next mission. And the costs that would be incurred by a task force trained and equipped to evacuate Swiss citizens in trouble anywhere in the world, if necessary using force, can be calculated on the basis of the German experience.⁶¹

Our financial situation is known, as is the necessity to first keep one's own affairs in order. **If the current period of apparent security is promoting such costly flights of fancy, it is up to our parliament – and ultimately the Swiss voters – to keep things in proper perspective. Because these notions – copied from abroad and of little originality – have not been thought through.**

The Swiss army must withdraw the troops it is deploying outside of Switzerland, with the exception of the defence attachés and the students attending important academies, and must concentrate on its core duties.

Compulsory military service

The schedule of training periods and the overall duration of military service must be determined on the basis of defence department studies. **However, the objective of Swiss military training must be to meet the requirements of combatworthiness.** Half measures designed to take into account the demands of the militia soldiers have the opposite effect: they drive the best people out of leadership positions. **Tough training does not put people off; what does is the impossibility of providing a good and credible performance. Furthermore, anything that falls beyond the primary mission of the army must also be avoided.**

⁶¹ Refer to, for example, 'Der Spiegel', 14/1997.

XI. How shall we proceed?

After the failure of the Brunner commission to provide a valid basis, the discussion on how the strategy should be developed in the future must be set on a better foundation.

We should begin by finding an answer – borne by the people – to the question ‘what do we, in this changing world, have that we want to defend, and what is worth fighting for?’ **Up to now, freedom, independence and democracy were the central values.**

Then we must **mark out way and means** which will allow us to preserve these values. We must **signpost the wrong turnings** we should, for our own protection, avoid. Armed neutrality will play a part in this context, as will self-limitation of our presence on the international stage, the willingness to take risks for the sake of freedom and independence, and solidarity with those who are suffering.

On the basis of a sober global and European assessment of the situation, and regardless of preconceived ideas, **the threat of aggression in all its changing facets must be examined**, followed by an assessment of how the army, the civil defence organisation and the state security forces can provide appropriate protection. **Information war, brutal aggression on Swiss soil triggered by outside civil wars, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists and rogue states as well as international crime must be clearly outlined in scenarios.**

The next step is to outline a **doctrine** which must specify how situations of this kind can be countered, and what steps we are willing to take.

Once all these aspects have been looked into, and not before, we can develop **ideas on troop strengths, organisation, equipment, training and financing.**

This is the launching point for **cross-linked planning**. Answers to the last questions will influence the answers previously obtained to other questions. Interlinkage in the thought processes, thinking in systems, in scenarios and in options is called for.⁶²

The consequences of individual reforms must be thought through to the end, also in respect of their undesirable yet ultimately unavoidable effects.

The danger today – and it is a significant one – is that a totally different discussion will be conducted on the back of the army: the discussion on membership in the UN, EU, WEU and NATO. These are overriding questions of fundamental political significance, questions that reach far beyond the scope of military strategy, even though the answers found can have a serious impact on the future development of the army. The dignity of the citizen-soldier who has his own political views must be respected. **In-service indoctrination is an abuse of the powers of command, and must be punished under penal law.** Propaganda must be prohibited. The reform proposals currently on the table have yet to be finalised; the soldier-citizen is entitled to express different views. **If you carry politics into the army, you will destroy the army.**

The maxim must be:

Yes to change, yes to realistic protection against the dangers of our modern times. Yes to innovation and yes to the future.

No to a naive security policy, no to a self-important and copycat foreign policy, no to playing the lord of the manor.

⁶² Peter Schwartz: ‘The Art of the Long View. Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World’, New York, 1991, and Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper: ‘Hope Is Not a Method. What Business Leaders can Learn from the American Army’, New York, 1996. Change Management has become a fashion commodity; not everything that is proposed is sagacious. A method should soon be agreed on, then propagated and applied with determination.

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Internet

Access to the fundamental documents and to numerous studies dealing with the reforms currently being applied to the US armed forces can be obtained at the following addresses:

- <http://www.defenselink.mil>
- <http://www.defenselink.mil/dodreform/>
- <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/>
- [http://www. Defenselink.mil/pubs/](http://www.Defenselink.mil/pubs/)

Recommended reading:

- Joint Vision 2010
- National Military Strategy for the USA 1997
- National Security Strategy for a New Century
- Quadrennial Defense Review
- National Defense Panel, Final Report: Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century.

The British government has chosen a different track for reforms: Minister of Defence George Robertson presented a Strategic Defence Review paper on 12 March 1998:

- <http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs3-98.html>

On the information war:

- <http://jya.com/iwdmain.htm>
- <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/szfran.html> (Col. Richard Safranski: Theory of Information Warfare. Preparing for 2020)
- <http://sac.saic.com/iw.HTM> (with numerous links)
- <http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html> (Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare; with numerous links)
- <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/cmdpubs/landcmbt.htm> (Land Combat in the 21st Century)
- <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/hotlinks.htm> (Hotlinks to Military and Strategy Related Sites, compiled by the US Army War College and others): Comprehensive list of web addresses dealing with military institutions, publications, foreign military addresses, think tanks, political groupings, newspapers and magazines, etc.

Please note: the Internet lives, addresses change.